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Abstract
This special issue addresses the question of how to understand the civic turn within
immigrant integration in the West towards programs and instruments, public
discourses and political intentions, which aim to condition, incentivize, and shape
through socialization immigrants into ‘citizens’. Empirically, it focuses on the less
studied Scandinavian cases of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. In this introduction,
we situate the contributions to this special issue within the overall debate on civic
integration and convergence. We introduce the three cases, critically discuss the
(liberal) convergence thesis and its descriptive and explanatory claims, and explain
why studying the Scandinavian welfare states can further our understanding of the
nature of the civic turn and its driving forces. Before concluding, we discuss whether
civic integration policies actually work.
Keywords: Immigrant integration, Civic integration, Scandinavia, Convergence, Public
philosophy
Introduction
This special issue, which grew out of lively discussions in an ECPR Joint Sessions
workshop in Warsaw in April 2015, addresses the broad question of how to under-
stand the turn, within immigrant integration policies, towards programs and instru-
ments, public discourses and political intentions, which aim to condition, incentivize,
and shape through socialization, immigrants into ‘citizens’. Focusing on the less studied
cases of Sweden, Norway and Denmark, it critically engages a growing body of re-
search within migration studies, which has diagnosed a convergence – in policies, dis-
courses, or both – of Western states towards a liberal or civic integrationist middle
ground, beyond ‘national models’ of either ethno-nationalist assimilation or multicul-
turalism, and indeed beyond nationalism as a political force.
The liberal convergence thesis, associated with the work of Joppke (2007) and others
(e.g., Goodman, 2010; Green, 2007; Müller, 2007), has been challenged in comparative
and single case studies (e.g., Bonjour & Lettinga, 2012; Jensen, 2016; Meer & Modood,
2009; Mouritsen, 2013; Borevi, 2014) as well as theoretically. Appraisals of the ‘turn’
differ, with some authors diagnosing an “illiberal”, “Schmittean” liberalism (Orgad,
2015; Triadafilopoulos, 2011) of “identity” and Foucauldian discipline (Tebble, 2006;
Joppke, 2010), while others see a more benign, would-be Habermasian constitutional
patriotism (Müller, 2007; Goodman, 2014).1 The thesis involves a claim about driving
forces and draws attention to external and systemic factors, such as globalizing
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markets and supranational judicial norms and institutions, while it downplays or
refutes national models and path dependence explanations.
Yet, significant variation remains between European countries in the scope, types, lo-
cation, and degrees of demandingness of civic integration requirements introduced, as
well as in the normative arguments that politicians use to justify them (Goodman,
2012, 2014). Indeed, according to Goodman (2012, p. 665–667) Sweden (along with
Finland, Portugal and Spain) is not part of the turn since the country has not intro-
duced “civic integration, formalized tests, assessment of country knowledge, or
mandatory courses”. However, as articles in this volume reveal, if we apply a different,
more ideational understanding of civic integration, it is clear that Swedish legislators
are not immune to discourses associated with this trend. Are such remaining differ-
ences, and such important outliers – all of which bear their share of the European im-
migration challenge – evidence of other, more conjunctural forces of e.g. government
ideology or coalitional politics? Or do they, after all, continue to reflect institutional
and discursive path dependencies of national traditions and public philosophies of inte-
gration? Moreover, do further differences come into view when we investigate the turn
to citizen-making in other fields, beyond the typical focus in the literature on integra-
tion requirements for entry, permanent residence and naturalization?
This issue seeks to elucidate such questions through a series of tightly matched com-
parative studies across a range of policy areas of a distinct European region, Scandinavia.
As small and open countries Sweden, Norway, and Denmark face similar exposures to
economic globalization. They share histories of international humanitarianism and
staunch support of human rights conventions. Each cherishes national identities and pub-
lic cultures of pride in social equality, promotion of women’s and children’s rights, and
culturally liberated life styles. These accomplishments rest on the institutions of compre-
hensive welfare states of much the same type, and with much the same structural vulner-
abilities – in Norway, particularly after recent setbacks of the oil economy. All three
countries have based their large, still very redistributive public sectors on high labour
market participation rates and tax payment capacity of both men and women. All are
concerned about maintaining high levels of social equality and trust as elements of soci-
etal cohesion. These strong institutional, structural, and ideational similarities make them
some of the most likely candidates to converge if the liberal convergence thesis is correct
that global and European pressures external to the welfare state are the main drivers of
national integration policy.
Yet, elites and large segments of electorates view the challenge of immigration and
integration quite differently. If Sweden’s resistance towards even minimally demanding
integration policies, at least at the gates of entry, residence, and citizenship – and as we
shall see also other fields of integration – continues to perplex international commenta-
tors (Borevi, 2014), so does neighboring Denmark’s opposite trajectory. In this country,
the late nineties departure from a common Scandinavian citizenship regime (Ersbøll,
2005) has been followed by ever tightened restrictions over the last two decades, with
open public espousal by even mainstream politicians of nationalist cultural assimilation
(Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013). Both countries’ politicians and publics view the other’s
policies and discourse with increasing hostility. And Norway’s in-between course, previ-
ously inspired by Sweden, now leaning towards Denmark, provides an interesting ex-
ample of normative cross-pressure – between concerns with cultural cohesion and
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pessimism concerning the will and ability of Muslim immigrants to adapt (as in
Denmark), and a strong ideology of human rights and equal treatment (as in Sweden)
(Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012).
Three of the articles in this special issue use Scandinavian countries to test the liberal
convergence thesis in three policy areas outside the naturalization trajectory: labour
market activation (Breidahl), family reunification (Bech, Borevi & Mouritsen) and the
school (Fernández & Jensen). The fourth article (Simonsen) looks at the actual impact
of civic conditioning on immigrants’ feelings of host national belonging, testing
whether one of the rationales behind much restrictive naturalization policy withstands
empirical scrutiny.
To assess the descriptive and explanatory arguments involved in the convergence the-
sis, some conceptual groundwork is called for. We must clarify what convergence
means in the first place and what it is that supposedly converges. The next section dis-
cusses convergence in relation to the two concepts of civic integration and the civic
turn. The following two sections apply these discussions to the Scandinavian cases and
briefly introduce the two most central kinds of explanations for how integration policy
has developed in Scandinavia: national philosophies and party-political dynamics.
Before concluding, we discuss whether civic conditioning actually works.
Civic integration, the civic turn and convergence
To assess and meaningfully talk about convergence, we need a clear understanding of
what civic integration implies and, consequently, how we might measure the claim that
countries are converging towards it. Is it a specific tool box of policy instruments to
condition immigrants’ access to various legal statuses on meeting certain requirements or
is it a perfectionist liberal, non-nationalistic philosophy of integration – or is it both?
Scholars doing increasingly sophisticated comparative work on citizenship acquisi-
tion, integration programs and tests tend to employ the term to denote a set of particu-
lar policies (Goodman, 2010; Howard, 2009; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012).
Others, notably Joppke himself and scholars debating whether or not multiculturalism
and civic nationalism are either dead or “rebalanced” (Meer & Modood, 2009) and old
school ethno-cultural nation-building discredited (Kostakopoulou, 2010), tend to see
the term as an ideological reorientation of public philosophies as well as a common
shift ‘from rights to duties’ in the dominant ideas about how immigrant integration is
best promoted via state policies (e.g. Joppke, 2007, 2010). How and whether we actually
assess claims of convergence depends on which conceptualization of civic integration
we select. Moreover, as the following will show, defining it only in terms of policy in-
struments appears unsustainable while defining it in terms of a public philosophy im-
plies that the field has had a too narrow policy focus.
Following the first understanding of civic integration as a particular set of policy in-
struments that conditions access to various legal statuses, it is clear that most European
countries have introduced, since the nineties, formalized integration requirements
pertaining to language, knowledge, and employment conditioning access to entry, per-
manent residence, citizenship, and, in some cases family reunification. Yet, the trouble
with focusing exclusively on certain policy instruments is, first, that they can be
designed in different ways and embody a range of different intentions, which cannot
simply be ordered according to degree of restrictiveness (Goodman, 2012).
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Consequently, such analyses, even if they show policy convergence, cannot be used to
argue that states are moving away from different national philosophies or nationalism
towards more similar ideas about what integration is and entails. Second, with a re-
stricted focus on civic integration requirements it arguably makes little sense even to
talk of convergence. As Goodman (2010, 2014) demonstrates, before the introduction
of such instruments in the mid-to-late 1990s, most countries had no formalized civic
integration requirements attached to permanent residence and citizenship. Hence, the
turn was not a move towards increasing similarity, but indeed a turn. European coun-
tries, in fact, were highly similar in not having such requirements. Therefore, at most, a
move took place from one type of similarity to another – except that the significant
variation in requirements more appropriately suggests divergence, and above all
establishment of an independent policy area where none existed before.
Finally, and perhaps more crucial, we should critically discuss why certain demands
and requirements are defined as civic integrationist and not others, and consequently
how indexes to measure policies across countries are designed. Thus, with a narrower
understanding of civic integration as a certain set of integration requirements, we run
the risk of losing sight of why – i.e., according to which selection criteria – these re-
quirements and indicators were chosen in the first place. In other words, in order to
define the criteria for this particular kind of policy, we need to ask what it seeks to
achieve. Yet, when we begin to define criteria in terms of the intent behind the policies
we venture into the realm of ideas. Here, it becomes impossible to define a fixed list of
policies, or policy areas for that matter, because, as already noted, a given policy can
embody different intentions in different contexts. If civic integration policies reflect a
new engagement across states to actively make immigrants into citizens, we should ex-
pect that other policies – besides the usually mentioned tests, contracts, courses and
oaths – can be part of this development. Moreover, to the extent that variation exists
across states, about what qualities and virtues constitute a “good citizen”, what counts
as civic integration policies may even be country-specific.2 Along this line, Bech, Borevi
and Mouritsen (2017) argue that the lack of measures of economic and age require-
ments in Goodman’s CIVIX index is a flaw in relation to family reunification, as such
requirements, at least in a Scandinavian context, are closely connected to notions of
civic maturity and self-sufficiency.
Conversely, if we understand the civic integrationist turn along the second line, as
convergence mainly around a broader (neo)liberal, non-nationalistic philosophy of inte-
gration, within and between states, we should use other criteria for assessing the conver-
gence thesis. Specifically, we must investigate whether intentions behind changing policies
converge on a civic integrationist philosophy as distinct from national model-varieties of
either cultural nationalist or multicultural rationales. This has two important implications.
First, refuting the convergence thesis require more than simply demonstrating strong
policy differences between countries – in the way e.g. Koopmans et al. (2012) arguably do.
Ideational convergence on the level of public philosophy need not result in significant
policy convergence since such ideas pass through national structures, institutions,
agendas, and power dynamics before they translate into policy solutions. Second, an
analysis of convergence cannot limit itself to a specific set of policies, because we cannot
assume that states or governments draw similar policy conclusions from the same ideas.
A public philosophy in and by itself is too abstract to provide clear-cut answers to which
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policy solutions serve its vision best (Mehta, 2010). Although a certain public philosophy
cannot be paired with just anything, it only works as a meta-heuristic to narrow down the
field of legitimate policy solutions. Consequently, different public philosophies may over-
lap in the kind of policies they enable, especially when we also remember that an integra-
tion requirement may express more than one intention. The upshot of all this is that we
must always carefully trace the impact of philosophical ideas on policy instead of assum-
ing that certain policies necessarily embody certain ideas (Daigneault, 2013).
A second, but related, point regarding public philosophies of integration – be it civic
integration or some nationally specific kind – is that we should expect them to have an
effect on all policies, which attempt to further immigrant integration – not just integra-
tion requirements for entry, permanent residence and naturalization. Consequently,
analyses which argue that convergence has taken place – or dispute it – should expand
their focus beyond the citizenship trajectory. Only few studies have taken this road so
far. This special issue tries to do so by analyzing labour market policy, family reunifica-
tion rules and school policy. Indeed, as argued by Fernández and Jensen (2017), the
way that a public philosophy narrows down the range of legitimate policy solutions has
just as much to do with how it configures policy areas as relevant for integration as
with the policies employed within particular integration policy areas such as
naturalization rules or citizenship education.
With this ideational perspective on convergence, we cannot assume, for example, that
Sweden has not been impacted by the civic integrationist turn, just because it has no
formalized integration requirements regarding language, knowledge or employment.
An ideational change may have had different policy implications than in other
countries.
Rather than ‘civic integration’, the title of this introduction and the special issue uses
the term ‘civic turn’. We employ it to avoid the confusions that surround ‘civic integra-
tion’ – and to emphasize that, indeed, an ideational turn is visible while keeping an
open mind about convergence or divergence regarding both ideas and policy. Yes,
states increasingly emphasize civic culture or ‘good citizenship’ as modes of integrating
culturally plural societies. However, citizenship, its universalistic core notwithstanding,
is also a cultural phenomenon, which reflects different national trajectories and histor-
ical path-dependencies (as in historical sociology, e.g. Turner, 1990) and is susceptible
to ideological contestations within countries. Hence, the notion of liberal convergence
ignores that some instruments and policies, and certainly the national discourses legit-
imizing them, are hardly all liberal (or liberal in the same sense: some concern political
liberal values, others neo-liberal economic self-reliance), but in some cases more “re-
publican” or “instrumental nationalist” (Mouritsen, 2013).
In conclusion, Western European countries are indeed, in a broad sense, moving to-
wards the universalistic corner of Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy’s (2005) well-
known diagram. But the way they do so arguably reproduces old differences, restated
within particular national vocabularies of civic nationalism, and leave many policies and
institutions of immigrant incorporation in place.
Comparing the Scandinavian countries
Sweden, Denmark and Norway are ideal candidates for a ‘most similar’ comparative
case study. They are all small and open welfare state economies, built around similar
Borevi et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2017) 5:9 Page 5 of 14
comprehensive, universal welfare state ideology and organization (Esping-Andersen,
1990), subjecting them to similar financial pressures from the migration of low-skilled
labour and the globalization of production (Andersen, 2004). Despite these similarities,
the countries have approached immigrant integration quite differently, and these differ-
ences have increased in recent decades (Jensen, 2016; Djuve & Kavli, 2007). Hence, it is
worthwhile to study these countries to further our understanding of the nature of the
civic turn and its driving forces.
First, such comparisons help us show and assess the point made above, that different
definitions and measures of civic integration may yield different conclusions in terms
of how to characterize diverse national policy developments. In all indexes of (civic) in-
tegration policy, regardless of indicators, Denmark and Sweden are at opposite ends,
Sweden in the permissive extreme and Denmark in the restrictive one. When included,
Norway is typically placed closer to the middle. Denmark has strict economic, language
and knowledge requirements with programs and tests for both permanent residence
and naturalization. Norway has a mandatory introduction program and recently also a
relatively soft language and knowledge tests for naturalization. Sweden still has no such
integration requirements for permanent residence or naturalization. As they take into
account the arguments behind policy changes, articles in this issue provide a more nu-
anced characterization of the civic turn in immigrant integration policy than those of
the index studies, including the conclusion that Sweden, indeed, may also be part of it.3
Second, Scandinavian comparisons help us explore the explanatory power of public
philosophies and national models in combination with factors highlighted in literatures
on political power relations and party-political dynamics. Similarities in the countries’
welfare state system and economic situation allows us to exclude some of the external
variables mentioned in the literature. If external pressures were main drivers of policy
change, as in the liberal convergence thesis, convergence would be particularly likely
between Scandinavian welfare states, which are similarly vulnerable to the structural
squeeze of global competition and immigration because of their comparatively strong
redistributive schemes and high wages.
Also, the countries remain relatively similar when it comes to public opinion on im-
migration and cultural diversity (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). Studies using
data from the European Social Survey show that, although the Swedish public generally
displays a somewhat more positive attitude towards immigration and support for equal
rights, the Danish and Norwegian publics typically cluster with Sweden when compared
to other European countries (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Nagayoshi & Hjerm,
2015; Sides & Citrin, 2007).
However, the three countries diverge on two internal factors, each offering (competing) ex-
planatory accounts: national identities and public philosophies; and party-political dynamics.
We argue, as do each of the articles in this special issue, that the Scandinavian coun-
tries, despite their similarities, represent significantly different national identity construc-
tions. While the universalist welfare state is crucial to each country’s national self-image
(Berggren & Trägårdh, 2006; Mouritsen, 2006; Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013; Stråth, 2000),
and while all countries depend on high levels of trust and solidarity, social mobil-
ity, high labour market participation and high taxation levels (Andersen, 2004),
each country has its own understanding of how social cohesion and welfare state
sustainability comes about.
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In Denmark, a society-centered and bottom-up perspective is the predominant,
which sees (pre)existing cultural homogeneity as indispensable for the welfare state and
maintains a ‘populist’ view of political sovereignty, where politicians should respond to,
and respect the people, and where legislation to a lesser extent reflects preparatory
commissions and expert advice (Jensen, 2014). In Sweden, a more state-centred and
top-down approach prevails, whereby the modernizing welfare state promotes social in-
clusion and integrates society through equal treatment (Borevi, 2017). Politicians are
more likely to see their role as one of leading the people and propose legislation in ac-
cordance with these guiding norms, and with social science emanating from expert
commissions. Norway occupies an ambivalent, perhaps even confused, middle ground,
which mixes strong concern with cultural and identitarian cohesion – but often filtered
through expert commissions as ‘instrumental’ sociological arguments (rather than
Denmark’s more populist political culture) – with equal treatment and human rights
concerns, which are closer to Sweden.
Different historical experiences no doubt contribute to these ideational variations.
Despite rather similar histories of ethnic homogeneity, immigration, and dominant
Lutheran state churches, the countries had different experiences with mass emigration
to the US in the early 20th century (nearly 1.5 million Swedes emigrated, only some
400.000 from Denmark) as well as with the size and timing of post-war immigration,
which was larger and started earlier in Sweden compared to Denmark and Norway.
This arguably contributed to the emergence and reinforcement of different path de-
pendencies in immigrant integration policy (Borevi, 2012, 2017; Bengtsson & Borevi,
2015). So did, possibly, the fact that only Norway and Sweden had ‘internal’ territorial
aboriginal minorities (the Sami and Finish populations). Denmark, by comparison, had
colonies (Greenland and the Faroe Islands) and a small German-speaking minority in
Schleswig. Finally, Sweden’s neutrality during the Second World War (where Norway
and Denmark became occupied) may have induced more sustained questioning of its
own past (e.g., eugenics in the thirties) and impetus towards anti-racism than in the
other two countries.
The different reasoning of Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian policy-makers in matters
of immigrant integration may reflect such variations of national self-understanding.
The most obvious example, which is not discussed in this special issue (but see Jensen,
2016; Brochmann & Seland, 2010), may be seen in rules and arguments surrounding
citizenship acquisition in the three countries. Denmark’s Sonderweg departure since
2001 from a common Scandinavian naturalization regime towards increasingly heavy-
handed conditionalities, and easier loss of nationality (Ersbøll, 2016; Mouritsen, 2013),
contrasts starkly with Sweden’s continuously very liberal, lightly conditioned regime.
Norway’s nationality law characteristically falls somewhere in the middle, with both
restrictive and liberal elements, including much more lenient language and know-
ledge requirements.
Where Danish debates on naturalization remain highly politicized, tied to issues of
deservingness, cultural assimilation, security, and ideas about citizenship as something
sacred, which should be difficult (Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013), Norwegian debates have
been less protracted and discourses less harsh. They have centered on concern that
new citizens should be able to belong and have undivided political loyalty – hence
Norway’s continuing resistance to dual citizenship – as well the vulnerability of Norway
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as a small language community. Yet, despite introduction of a light language require-
ment, an oath of allegiance, and mandatory participation in an integration program
(without tests), citizenship is now, unlike previously and in sharp contrast to Denmark,
a legal entitlement (Midtbøen, 2015). Sweden, characteristically, has had no debate to
speak of, and citizenship remains demonstrably void of national symbolism, with
naturalization being an easy, largely administrative affair (Bernitz & Bernitz, 2005).
Turning to party political factors, we also find important differences. First, while
Denmark and Norway have had a long experience of electorally quite successful popu-
list right wing parties, this is a more recent phenomenon in Sweden. In both Denmark
and Norway, a populist right-wing party – named the Progress Party in both countries
– came into parliament in 1973. The Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), in-
creasingly successful, since 1997 received between 14 and 23 per cent of the vote and is
now part of the Norwegian government. Until today, their influence on integration pol-
icies has been curbed by a strong, partly strategic, political norm of broad consensus
on such issues (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2009). The Danish
Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) had the opposite experience with early success but
lower polls in the 1990s. In 1995 the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), which
broke away from the Progress Party in 1995, emerged as the new major populist right-
wing party. It has exercised significant influence on Danish immigration and citizenship
policies, particularly because the 2001-11 Conservative-Liberal government depended
on them for its parliamentary majority in most cases. In Sweden, during a short period
1991–1994, a populist right-wing party – New Democracy (Ny Demokrati) – was for
the first time represented in parliament but only since 2010 have a new populist right-
wing party – the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) – gained a more continu-
ous representation. Contrary to Denmark and Norway, the strategy of the mainstream
parties has been to isolate the Sweden Democrats, which means that, at least in the
short run, its parliamentary success has not translated in stricter policies, but rather
the contrary, as all other parties actively dissociated themselves from this party.
Different conditions for centre-right coalitions have also been used to explain policy
variations (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008). In
Denmark, centre-right parties only politicized integration issues and pursued restrictive
policies when the centrist Social Liberal Party was no longer seen as a viable govern-
ment partner (in 1993). In Sweden, by contrast, the Conservative party (Moderaterna)
has had an incentive to take a moderate approach, as its centre-right coalition partners
(the Liberals, the Agrarian Centre Party and (since 1991) the Christian Democrats) all
had outspoken pro-immigration profiles. In Norway, centre-right parties chose a strat-
egy of defusing integration issues in concert with the centre-left (Bale et al., 2009), cre-
ating a strong norm for consensus in issues of integration.
We contend that explanations based on party political dynamics and power relations
do not exclude explanations based on national path dependencies of political culture
and national self-understanding. Indeed, in both Sweden and Denmark, conceptions of
democracy, nationhood, and the relation between state and people may reinforce party
dynamics. As already touched upon, it is unfruitful to conceptualize philosophies of
integration as tight-knit paradigms, encompassing particular policy solutions, which
thereby circumscribe politics by definition. Instead, a dominant public philosophy of
integration sets the boundaries of public disagreement while leaving room for party-
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political dynamics to simultaneously impact policy decisions. As such, its effect regards
how far party politics may shift policies in one or the other direction. Hence, how
centre-left and centre-right parties respond to the success of populist right-wing parties
may also be influenced by what kind of challenge such a party constitute to the domin-
ant public philosophy of integration. In Denmark’s populist-communitarian context, it
has been less of a challenge than it remains in modernist-liberal Sweden.
The three comparative case studies in this special issue
Three of the studies in this special issue go beyond the naturalization trajectory and
focus on labour market activation policies in the three countries, the rules for family re-
unification in all three countries, and citizenship education in Denmark and Sweden,
respectively. The main question is whether party-political dynamics and philosophical
ideas are indeed similar across these different areas of integration policy, and whether
these areas display the same patterns as those seen within the politics of permanent
residence and naturalization. To what extent, if at all, is there a dominating philosoph-
ical and political pattern in the integration politics of these three countries?
In their article, Férnandez and Jensen show that within citizenship education pol-
icy Denmark and Sweden has undergone a similar divergence starting in the 1990s,
as was the case within naturalization policy. Behind this divergence, they argue, are
two very different, rather stable and consensual public philosophies. A Danish
monocultural philosophy, in which “assimilation is viewed normatively and causally
as a precondition of equal inclusion and opportunity” and a Swedish philosophy
that seeks an “equilibrium between pluralism and universalism” and renders “equal
inclusion and opportunity contingent on the ability of each, especially the majority,
to recognize the others.” Interestingly, they also find that Swedish school politics
have been highly concerned with how to form good, liberal-democratic citizens in
response to international migration, concluding that Sweden has indeed taken part
in the civic turn.
Bech, Borevi and Mouritsen argue that family reunification policies constitute one im-
portant, yet underexplored, field of civic integration. The article contributes to discus-
sions about the definition and measurement of civic integration in response to the
CIVIX index created by Goodman (2010, 2014). It makes two specific arguments. First,
that economic demands and age-requirements for family reunification is part of a larger
civic integration trend pertaining to ideas and norms of civic maturity, gender equality
and individual autonomy. Second, that we must take into account how family migration
involves a ‘double conditionality’ whereby integration requirements target both the civic
deservingness of the resident sponsor and the civic integration potential of an incom-
ing family member. Following this broader view of civic integration or indeed civic
selection – and taking into account the argumentative structures surrounding policy
change (and non-change) – the article systematically describes and compares the
trajectories of family migration policies in the three Scandinavian countries since the
late 1990 including the most recent changes. Policy responses remain remarkably
diverse, and in Sweden and Denmark’s cases non-converging, reflecting national phil-
osophies of integration. However, the article also documents a growing salience of a
controlling-the-number logic in all three countries, particularly in the wake of 2015
refugee crisis, which increasingly crowds out the politics of civic integration.
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Breidahl contributes with a comparative study of labour market activation policies in
Denmark, Sweden and Norway. In this integration policy area, rather than divergence,
important similarities come into view. All Scandinavian countries have introductory
programs for new-arrivals with strong emphasis on conditionality, although Sweden
does not tie participation in the programs to permanent residence or citizenship. Breidahl
argues that similar, strong and rooted norms of state involvement and employment cap-
acity, closely connected to the functionality of the universal welfare state, exist in all three
countries. However, she concludes that the “strong interconnection between activation
policies and the civic turn seems to be exceptional to the Scandinavian welfare states and
should not be interpreted as a retreat from national models”. Instead, it is a shared feature
of their respective national models, originating in the fiscal requirement of the universal
welfare state for high unemployment.
Overall, these three studies, in conjunction with existing ones on entry and naturalization,
demonstrate how the different public philosophies in the three countries configure which
policy areas become vehicles of civic integration as well as how civic integration is
approached within each of them.
Does civic integration policies work?
Evaluating whether civic integration policies actually work is difficult. Not only is high
quality data scarce but there are different ideas about the very goal of civic integration
policies making it uncertain which outcomes to investigate. In addition, we need to know
which policies actually count as civic integration, before evaluating their effectiveness.
The measures mostly associated with civic integration – integration requirements for
entry, permanent residence and naturalization – are often justified as ways to incentivize
and motivate immigrants to acquire certain capacities, attitudes and knowledge that
allows them to participate in the labor market, civil society and democracy. However, as
many studies show, integration requirements also serve as a civic screening mechanism to
keep out those (potential) immigrants who are more difficult to integrate (Goodman,
2011; Groenendijk, 2011; Van Oers, Ersbøll, & Kostakopoulou, 2010). Finally, civic inte-
gration policies may have symbolic goals, e.g. to signal to host populations, either that the
competence and ability of governments to control the country’s borders, or their concern
to maintain and strengthen cultural cohesion and national identity (Goodman & Wright,
2015, p. 1891; Permoser, 2012).
Accordingly, the question of whether these typical civic integration policies work can
be formulated (at least) in three ways: (1) does civic conditioning further the integra-
tion of immigrants?; (2) do civic integration policies screen for less easily integratable
immigrants?; (3) do policies reinforce citizens’ own narratives of nationhood? These
goals reflect the political reasoning of Western states generally, although, from a norma-
tive point of view, it is debatable that states may legitimately use any integration policy, of
any degree of restrictiveness, to further them (e.g., Carens, 2013; Miller, 2008).
To our knowledge, the two last goals of civic integration policies have received little
empirical attention. The immediate gatekeeping effects, in terms of pass rates for tests,
naturalization rates, and the type and numbers of immigrants arriving has been better
researched (e.g., Dronkers & Vink, 2012; Van Oers, 2013). A Danish evaluation report
showed that 40 percent of the applicants in 2008 were denied citizenship on grounds
of language insufficiency (Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010). However, no one has investigated
Borevi et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2017) 5:9 Page 10 of 14
whether integration requirements actually select the immigrants most likely to (further)
integrate.
Some efforts have been devoted to the first question above. Goodman and Wright
(2015) assess the impact of civic integration policies on immigrants’ social integration
and report null-findings – policies seem to have little impact, either positively or nega-
tively, on immigrants’ self-reported financial well-being and levels of social trust. Ersanilli
and Koopmans (2011), in a comparison of Turkish guest workers in France, Germany and
the Netherlands, find linguistic and social assimilation to occur more when integration
requirements condition access to rights – although the effect is small.
In light of such research lacunae, Simonsen, in this special issue, importantly ad-
vances our knowledge in her study on the impact of citizenship policies on immigrants’
sense of host national belonging. Taking her theoretical point of departure in the
assumption that naturalization not only provides access to certain rights (“the legal
economy”), but also importantly signals full membership of the host nation (“the sym-
bolic economy”), Simonsen sets out to assess the importance of “policy signals” for
immigrants’ self-reported feelings of host national belonging. The article can be read as
a theoretical development and empirical test of the underlying logics (or intended
mechanisms) expressed in the civic integration discourse, i.e. “that civic conditioning is
conducive to integration”. However, Simonsen adds a symbolic mechanism to this the-
sis. Given that citizenship is very exclusive due to demanding civic requirements, we
would expect someone who attains this status to develop a stronger host nation attach-
ment or identification compared to someone who naturalizes into a country with a
more liberal “open door” citizenship regime. The study results in a null finding. By
themselves, policy signals (either strict or liberal) have no effect on immigrants’ sense
of belonging. The study does “support the idea that citizenship matters for feelings of
belonging, but only when it also matters for host nationals in their perceptions of who
belongs”. It seems to be the general attitude of the public, not policies, which matters
for cultivation of national identification.
Conclusion
It is difficult to counter the claim that integration politics in the West has given way to
a liberal-democratic semantic and focus on good citizenship while overtly ethno-
nationalist reasoning has been delegitimized. However, we argue that the study of how
civic integration policies develop must be attentive to how different understandings of
‘civicness’ dominates in different countries in ways that tie in with conceptions of na-
tionhood, the ideational boundaries of party politics, and the reactions of mainstream
political parties to successful populist right-wing parties. Moreover, the field should
look beyond the citizenship trajectory to other areas of integration policy to gain a
deeper awareness of civic integration in its different forms.
The Scandinavian countries are good examples. On the surface political parties seem
to subscribe to similar notions of good citizenship and social cohesion, but underneath
they diverge strongly as to what maintaining strong welfare states implies in terms of
the efforts and obligations of immigrants and citizens, and as to where the state should
place its effort. They have quite different ideas about the socialization process through
which immigrants must pass in order to integrate, and what motivates immigrants to
do so. In other words, studies must be aware of the empirical assumptions political
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actors make use of; their notions of what works and why (Jensen, 2014). Especially,
since they have little empirical knowledge, based on social science research, to guide
their claims – the few studies that do exist suggest either no or minimal policy effects
– these should be viewed as ideological. Scholars in the field must intensify their efforts
to study the actual effects of civic integration policies, and, by providing such factual
grounding, they must help shelter policy developments in the field from the worst en-
trapments of ‘common sense’ ideological illusions about what works and why.
Endnotes
1Within Joppke’s own convergence reading lurks, paradoxically, variations between
Rawlsian (UK), perfectionist republican-liberal and form-of-life liberal (France,
Netherlands), and “repressive” Gesinnung-liberalisms (some conservative Länder in
Germany) (Joppke, 2009).
2This of course potentially constitute a fundamental problem for index construction
as such, since it affects the comparability of country scores.
3To the extent the civic turn denotes a ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ – a shift in
focus from concerns of the collective identities of immigrants to a preoccupation of
defining and strengthening the host national identity – then policy developments in
Sweden, at least since the early 1990s, may well be portrayed as part of this trend (Bor-
evi, 2010, 2014).
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